This paper considers whether …at money can be provided by a revenue-maximizing monopolist in an environment where money is essential. Two questions arise concerning the private supply of money: Is it feasible and is it optimal? Concerning the feasibility question, I show that the revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent if the trading history of the issuer is public information and if money demanders respond to the revelation of defection by playing autarky. Concerning the optimality question, the model suggests that any private organization of the market for …at currency is suboptimal.
Introduction
This paper considers whether …at money can be provided by a revenue-maximizing monopolist in an environment where money is essential. 1 Two questions arise concerning the private supply of money: Is it feasible and is it optimal? Concerning the feasibility question, I show that the revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent if the trading history of the issuer is public information and if money demanders respond to the revelation of defection by playing autarky. Concerning the optimality question, the model suggests that any private organization of the market for …at currency is suboptimal.
The existence of a monetary equilibrium relies on two features that rule out the timeinconsistency problem: public knowledge of the monopolist's trading history and the existence of punishment strategies that credibly eliminate any future pro…ts of the monopolist if executed. Public knowledge of the issuer's trading history is needed to trigger the punishment strategies if the monopolist deviates from the announced policy. The credibility of the punishment strategies guarantees that it is optimal to use them if the monopolist deviates. The notion that the market can discipline private issuers of …at currency goes back at least to von Hayek (1976, S. 30 ) who conjectured that "the slightest suspicion that the issuer was abusing his position when issuing money would lead to a depreciation of its value and would at once drive him out of business. It would make him lose what might be an extremely pro…table kind of business."
Thus, as suggested by von Hayek (1976) , punishment strategies e¤ectively eliminate the time-inconsistency problem. The equilibrium allocation, however, is suboptimal. The reason is that the …rst-best allocation requires a de ‡ation which is not consistent with positive pro…ts once the initial stock of money is sold since only positive in ‡ation rates generate the expected pro…ts that make the monopolist willing to adhere to his announced sequence of money supplies.
The monetary equilibrium is characterized as follows: Initially, the monopolist announces the entire sequence of future money supplies and then o¤ers to exchange the initial stock of money for real commodities. Agents accept the initial o¤er because there is no record, as yet, about the monopolist's past play. In each subsequent period, each agent accepts monetary exchanges (goods for money) from other agents and from the monopolist if and only if the monopolist has not deviated from the announced money supply sequence.
Thus, if any deviation occurs, each agent refuses to produce for money today and, in fact, in the future. For each agent it is optimal to respond to the revelation of defection by playing autarky if all other agents respond likewise. Accordingly, the monopolist cannot gain by defection, and, therefore, accepting money in the initial period is a best response.
The model of this paper is based on Shi's (1997 Shi's ( , 1999 ) random-matching model with divisible money and divisible real commodities. In Shi's model, the money supply is exogenously given; one contribution of this paper, therefore, is to endogenize the supply of money in the random-matching model with divisible money. The paper is related to several papers that study the private supply of money. Random-matching models include Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides (1999), Ritter (1995) , Williamson (1999) and Martin and Schreft (2003) . They all study environments with indivisible money and an exogenous upper bound on individual money holdings. I dispense with these assumptions and allow agents to carry any non-negative amount of fully divisible money. Nonrandom matching models include Calvo (1978) , Klein (1975) , and Taub (1985) .
Because of their treatment of the time-inconsistency problem, the models of Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a) and Ritter (1995) are of special relevance for this paper. Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a) assume that trading histories of bankers, who issue distinguishable inside monies, are public knowledge, and they show that this knowledge is su¢ cient to rule out the time-inconsistency problem. They derive the incentive-feasible allocation that maximizes the nonbanking sector's welfare and show that this allocation requires note issue and redemption by the bankers. In Ritter's (1995) model a subset of the population belongs to a coalition that issues …at money. The sequence of money supplies is chosen to maximize the coalition members' discounted utility from trading with nonmembers.
He shows that the coalition is able to promise credibly to limit the issue of money if the coalition's involvement in the economy is su¢ ciently large and if its members are su¢ ciently patient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 an adapted version of Shi's (1997 Shi's ( , 1999 model is presented; Section 3 considers the monopolist's revenue-maximizing sequence of money supplies when binding money supply announcements are feasible and when they are not feasible. Section 4 discusses the results and some extensions, and Section 5 concludes.
Demand
Money demand arises in the search-theoretic model of monetary exchange where money is used to alleviate the double coincidence of real wants problem. The model builds on Shi (1997 Shi ( , 1999 , who extended the search-theoretic approach developed by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) Shi (1997 Shi ( , 1999 ) also allows households to choose the fraction of buyers B in each period. To focus on the central issue of the paper, the problem of an optimal money supply sequence is examined when the fraction of buyers is given.
At the beginning of each period, the household has m t units of money and chooses a uniform consumption level for each member, c t , and the next period's money stock, m t+1 .
The household then divides evenly the money stock among its buyers so that each buyer holds m t =B units of money in a match and speci…es the trading strategies for its members.
After this, the agents are matched and carry out their exchanges according to the described strategies. Thereafter, members bring back their receipts of goods and money, and each member consumes c t units of goods. At the end of a period, the household receives money transfer t and carries the stock m t+1 to t + 1.
Household utility in a period is given by u (c) ky where c is the quantity of goods consumed, y is the quantity of goods produced, and k is the marginal cost of production where k > 0. The function u is de…ned on [0; 1), is increasing, three times di¤erentiable, and satis…es u (0) = 0; u 00 < 0, u 0 (0) = 1 and 2u 00 (c) + cu 000 (c) < 0. 4 The household discounts future utility with the discount factor 2 (0; 1).
Denote ! t the household's period t + 1 marginal value of money, discounted to period t. For the sake of simplicity, assume that a buyer who meets an appropriate seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the seller, and the seller accepts it if made no worse o¤ by accepting. The take-it-or-leave-it o¤er is the pair (q t ; x t ), where q t is the quantity of goods produced by the seller for x t units of money. If the seller accepts the o¤er, the acquired money balances x t will add to the household's money balances at the beginning of period t + 1, whose value is t x t . The cost associated with this trade is kq t and the seller accepts the o¤er if x t t kq t . Thus, any optimal o¤er satis…es
Because a buyer cannot exchange more money than he has, the o¤er (q t ; x t ) satis…es
A household's trading strategy consists of the pair (q t ; x t ) for each buyer, and the numbers t 2 f0; 1g and m t 2 f0; 1g for each seller. Given the o¤er (Q t ; X t ) by a buyer of another household, the seller decides either to accept ( t = 1) or to reject ( t = 0). Sellers also receive o¤ers to produce for money from the monopolist (details are speci…ed in the next section), which the sellers accept (
. For each period, the household chooses (m t+1; c t ; q t ; x t ), and ( t ; m t ) to solve the following maximizing problem:
subject to (1), (2), and
The variables taken as given in the above problem are the state variable m t and other households'choices. Inequality (4) speci…es the household's consumption. With probability z (1 B), a buyer meets an appropriate seller and he receives t q t units of goods. Because B is the measure of buyers per household, z (1 B) B t q t represents the total quantity of consumption goods acquired by the household. Equation (5) speci…es the household's cost of producing for other households and for the issuer. The …rst term on the righthand side is the household's cost of producing for other households. A seller meets with probability zB an appropriate buyer and produces t Q t units of goods at cost k t Q t . 7
As the fraction of sellers is (1 B), total cost for the household is z (1 B) Bk t Q t .
The second term speci…es the household's cost of producing for the monopolist. To simplify the problem, note the following: First, inequality (6) must hold with equality if money is valued in the future. Second, inequality (4) holds with equality, given the household's preferences; therefore, c t can be substituted by the equality of (4) throughout the problem. Third, by the equation (1), x t can be substituted throughout the problem.
Fourth, the other households'choices (Q t ; X t ) satisfy a condition similar to equation (1).
Thus, a household gets a nonnegative surplus when selling; therefore, t = t = 1 in a monetary equilibrium. 5 After substituting c t , x t , and t , the remaining choice is q t . Let t be the shadow price of inequality (2), expressed in period-t utility. Then, if u 0 (c t ) = @u(ct) @ct , the envelope condition for m t and the …rst order condition for q t are as follows:
Equation (7) is the optimality condition for m t . It states that the marginal cost of ac- 5 There exists a nonmonetary equilibrium with t = t = 0.
8 quiring money today, ! t , equals the discounted marginal bene…t of money tomorrow, ! t+1 , plus the discounted marginal bene…t of relaxing future cash constraints, z (1 B) t+1 .
Equation (8) states that, for a buyer in a desirable match, the marginal utility of consumption must equal the opportunity cost of the amount of money that must be paid to acquire additional goods. To buy another unit of a good, the buyer must give up k t units of money (see eq. (1)). Increasing the monetary payment has two costs to the buyer. He gives up the future value of money ! t and he faces a tighter constraint (2) . Together, ! t and t measure the marginal cost of obtaining a larger quantity of goods in exchange. (ii) choices and shadow prices are the same across households;
The …rst part of the de…nition requires that each household choose a best response against other household choices. Part (ii) states that the equilibrium is a symmetric solution to such best response correspondences, and part (iii) speci…es the exogenously given sequence of money supplies, where is the gross growth rate of money. In a symmetric equilibrium, lower-case variables equal capital-case variables and are replaced by the corresponding capital-case variables. Then, equations (7) and (8) give a single condition, which the monopolist takes into account when choosing the sequence of money supplies:
If the gross growth rate of money is constant (see Shi 1997 Shi , 1999 , the equilibrium quantity produced in a single-coincidence meeting is the value of Q that solves
.
Denote this value by Q . Then in a symmetric monetary equilibrium, in each period the buyers make the o¤er (Q ; X t ), which the sellers accept. In this model, money is neutral as the nominal quantity of money does not a¤ect real production. However, money is not superneutral. This can be seen from equation (10), which implies that Q is strictly decreasing in .
Supply
Money is o¤ered to the households by a single issuer. The issuer consists of a large number of members called money agents, and the number of members is such that the issuer can assign one member to each seller of each household. Members'preferences for goods are symmetric among goods and satisfy u (Q m ) = Q m , where Q m is the quantity of goods consumed. Money agents cannot produce real commodities; rather, they have the technology that permits them to create at no cost, a divisible, durable, and intrinsically useless object called money. Since they cannot produce real commodities no note redemption by the monopolist is feasible. As in Ritter (1995) , the sequence of money supplies is chosen to maximize the organization's joint discounted utility from trading with nonmembers.
Because all money agents are identical and their preferences are linear, this is equal to maximizing the expected discounted utility of a representative money agent. 6 The linear utility for the members of the monopolist household implies that the monopolist has no interest to smooth consumption across time. This creates a strong incentive to overissue money today since the marginal utility is not decreasing. Therefore, if my punishment strategies can discipline the monopolist for a linear utility function, they should also work for a strictly concave utility function.
Binding announcements I …rst consider the utility-maximizing policy when binding announcements are feasible and, thereafter, I consider nonbinding supply announcements.
In each case each period is divided into two subperiods. At the beginning of a period, household members meet randomly in pairs and carry out their trades; at the end of a period, the issuer assigns one member to each seller of each household, and each money agent makes the same take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (Q 
Given (11), the lifetime utility of a money agent can be expressed as P 1 t=0 k additional currency in each period. Accordingly, the monopolist's problem (thereafter called P M ) is to choose the sequence of nominal money supplies fM t g 1 t=1 that maximizes
subject to the demand conditions (9), and
Several comments are in order here. First, inequality (13) expresses the fact that money agents cannot redeem money. Second, it also highlights a key di¤erence between public and private issuers: Private issuers have no ability to tax agents'money balances whereas public issuers, at least in principal, have that power. This is why a private issuer cannot run the Friedman rule, which would require = < 1. Third, the sequence of
is homogenous of degree zero in the sequence fM t g 1 t=1 .
Thus, a proportional change in the money supply sequence has no e¤ect on the sequence of real revenues. This is a consequence of the neutrality of money, which is a property of 
and substitute this expression into the monopolist's objective function. This and equation
(1) yield the modi…ed objective
Maximization of (14) with respect to consumption c t yields the …rst-order conditions
According to equation (15) , in the initial period, the monopolist destroys the value of any old currency (c 0 = 0) and issues a new money. 8 Thereafter, by equation (16), the issuer earns seigniorage income by taxing (by selling additional units of money) the outstanding stock of money by a constant gross growth rate of money, . To derive , denote c t the value of c t that solves equation (16) and note that (16) implies that c t = c is constant. If c t is constant, the households'…rst-order condition (9) implies that t = where is the value of that solves
Next, note from (16) that u 0 (c) > k, which from (17) implies that > . Shi (1997) shows that the Friedman rule (i.e., = ) maximizes the utility of the households. Thus, not surprisingly, the monopolist's desire for seigniorage income induces him to have too much in ‡ation from the households'point of view. For certain parameter values, the solutions to the …rst-order conditions (16) and equation (17) involve de ‡ation, which violates condition (13). 9 Proposition 1, which takes this condition into account, characterizes the revenuemaximizing policy of the monopolist when binding announcements are feasible. Nonbinding announcements The time-inconsistency problem (possibly) associated with the optimal sequences fM t g (1978), Taub (1985) , Hellwig (1985) , and White (1999)) conclude that when no binding announcement are feasible, revenue-maximizing policies are time-inconsistent and this rules out any unregulated private organization of a market for …at currency (Hellwig 1985 p. 581). 10 The problem with this conclusion is that without specifying the demand for money after each possible history of the game, the question of whether the announced sequence of money supplies fM t g 1 t=1 is time-consistent or time-inconsistent cannot be answered. Knowledge of the demand for money after each possible history is crucial because this determines the monopolist's expected stream of future revenues after each possible deviation. 11 To construct a monetary equilibrium, however, it is not necessary to describe the entire game in detail; it is su¢ cient to show that a credible punishment strategy exists which eliminate the monopolist's desire to deviate from the announced policy.
For this purpose, denote = fQ m t ; X m t g 1 t=0 the announced optimal sequence of 10 Calvo (1978) was …rst to point out the time-inconsistency problem of a revenue-maximizing money supply sequence. The optimal solution fM t g 1 t=1 is time-consistent if for any t 0 , n, and t t 0 + n, M t (t 0 + n) = M t (t 0 ). That is, the optimal solution is time-consistent if what is optimal to do in period t from the vantage point of t 0 is also optimal when the point of departure is t 0 + n (see Calvo (1978) for this de…nition). 11 It is not surprising that the monopolist's desire to deviate depends on her expectation of the demand for money following any deviation. However, to my knowledge, with the exception of Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a and 1999b), the demand for money after out-of-equilibrium moves has not been studied before. The details of the demand for money are also important to determine quantitively how much the time-inconsistency problem accounts for periods of high in ‡ation in countries with poorly designed monetary institutions.
take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers de…ned by equations (18) and (19) . To construct punishment strategies, assume that the monopolist's trading history is public information and let t denote the monopolist's trading history, where t contains each take-it-or-leave-it o¤er the monopolist has made up to time t 1. Furthermore, let t denote the history of o¤ers associated with the announced policy and consider the history-dependent strategy h = m t+1 ; c t ; q t ; x t ; t ;
where m t+1 , c t , q t , and x t solve the representative household's maximization problem described in Section 2, given the announced policy , and t and m t are de…ned as follows:
The acceptance rule (20) speci…es a seller's behavior when matched with a buyer who makes the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er fQ t ; X t g. The seller accepts the o¤er if the monopolist's trading history, t , coincides with t , and if the surplus X t ! t kQ t is nonnegative. The acceptance rule (21) speci…es a seller's behavior when matched with a money agent who makes the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er fQ consisting of the sequence of take-it-or-leave-it-o¤ers and .
12
Proposition 2 The strategy pro…le h ; i is a subgame perfect monetary equilibrium. 12 Note that h ; i is not a strategy pro…le in a strict sense because it does not specify the monopolist's and households'actions if they observe an out-of-equilibrium move of a single household. However, because the measure of a household is zero, I ignore deviations of households and focus on out-of-equilibrium moves of the monopolist.
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Five comments are required here. First, any deviation by the monopolist triggers complete autarky. That is, every seller in every subsequent meeting refuses to produce for money. For each household it is optimal to respond to the revelation of defection by playing autarky if all other agents respond likewise. Second, if > 1 , it is strictly optimal for the monopolist to adhere to the announced policy because she can sell additional money in each period. If 1 , it is weakly optimal to adhere to the announced policy because the monopolist is indi¤erent between adhering to the announced plan and any deviation.
Third, if the monopolist makes a deviating o¤er that yields a strictly positive surplus to the seller's household at today's value of money, it is optimal for the seller not to accept the o¤er because of the household's belief that he cannot buy anything with the additional money in the future. Fourth, household must revert to complete autarky whenever the monopolist deviates. Households cannot just stop trading with the monopolist because each household would have an incentive to deviate from such a punishment strategy by accepting additional money from the monopolist. Fifth, in a more realistic information structure, the monopolist's past play would be revealed with a random delay. For example, one could assume that each period the public record of the monopolist's past transactions is updated with probability and that there is no updating with probability 1 . This implies that the average updating lag is 1= periods. Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) 15 On the other hand, more competition lowers future pro…ts which reduces the issuers'incentives to adhere to their announced sequences of money supplies.
The stability of the monetary system is another issue that arises with the private provision of currency. In an environment without uncertainty about the behavior of the monopolist punishment strategies work very e¤ectively to sustain the monetary equilibrium because the slightest suspicion that an issuer is abusing his position will trigger autarky.
In an environment with uncertainty such suspicions can arise when they are false. In such environments the monetary system is very fragile since it can collapse without real cause as in the bank-run literature where a run on a bank can occur even when the bank is perfectly 14 A public issuer of …at currency can implement the …rst-best allocation by following the Friedman rule. This policy, however, requires that the public issuer can extract …at currency from the economy. Note also that the Friedman rule only improves the allocation relative to the best allocation consistent with a monetary equilibrium in this model, if the cost of the tax system required to collect the currency is su¢ ciently low. 15 Here I assume that the competing issuers are involved in Cournot competition. In this case there exist a monetary equilibrium where an increase in the number of issuers decreases the average rate of in ‡ation.
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sound.
Finally, the issue arises whether a private issuer would implement stabilization policies that maximize society's welfare in an economy which is hit by aggregate real shocks. If not, this could be another reason why most economies have opted for a monopolistic public issuer of …at currency and not a private pro…t-maximizing one.
Summary
This paper considers a monopolist's revenue-maximizing supply of …at currency in a randommatching model with divisible money and divisible real commodities. When binding announcements are feasible, the monopolist's policy is characterized by an initial period where she initiates a currency reform which destroys the value of any old currency, and then issues new money, which she taxes by a constant gross growth rate of money.
The paper shows that even in the absence of binding policy announcements, this revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent. The time-consistency of the monopolist's policy relies on the public's knowledge of the issuer's trading history and on the existence of a credible punishment strategy. The punishment strategy involves complete autarky that is, each seller in every meeting refuses to produce for money. The punishment is credible because for each household it is optimal to play autarky if all other household respond likewise.
strategy yields zero revenue today and in the future. Thus, fQ is a best response to accept money in exchange for real commodities at date t. Therefore, neither the monopolist nor the household has a pro…table deviation in any period t > 0.
Next, consider the initial period. Given , the solution to the monopolist's maximization problem PM implies that is a best response against and, by the same reasoning as above, h is a best response against ; h . Thus, I conclude that the strategy pro…le h ; i is a Nash equilibrium.
Next, I show that the strategy pro…le h ; i is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
While doing so, I focus on out-of-equilibrium moves of the monopolist because the measure of a single household is zero and, therefore, deviations of a single household are irrelevant.
Consider any out-of-equilibrium move fQ that starts in the period following this deviation is the autarky equilibrium, and it is well known that the autarky equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of this subgame, in fact, of any subgame, including the whole game. If other households do not accept money, the best response for household h is not to accept money. Moreover, this best response is independent of the nature of the deviation of the monopolist.
